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JUDGE WEINFELD AND THE ADJUDICATORY
PROCESS: A LAW FINDER IN AN AGE
OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKERS
WILLIAM E. NELSON*
In his 25 years on the bench, Edward Weinfeld has attained a
nationwide reputation as an outstanding member of the federal
judiciary. Judge Weinfeld's reputation is based, in part, upon his
longstanding efforts to foster social justice and upon the new law
that those efforts have produced. As the other tributes will show,
the Judge's opinions have made much new law; very few other
district judges have been as innovative.
Judge Weinfeld has made his most important contributions in
the law of criminal procedure. Since the 1950's he has consistently
permitted criminal defendants to engage in broad pretrial discovery
so that "[a] trial with possible serious consequences to the defen-
dant and of importance to the public should not be treated 'as a
game of combat by surprise.' "1 In the 1960's he authored two sig-
nificant opinions prohibiting judicial participation in the plea-
bargaining process. 2 There have also been many other cases in
which the Judge has protected the procedural rights of criminal
defendants. He has held, for example, that testimony procured by
misleading statements on the part of the police cannot be admitted
at trial3 and that a grant of immunity from federal prosecution bars
any related state prosecution. 4
Before the Supreme Court entered the field, Judge Weinfeld
was one of the leading judicial protectors of constitutional rights in
noncriminal cases. He has consistently upheld the right to due pro-
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B., 1962, Hamilton College;
LL.B., 1965, New York University; Ph.D., 1971, Harvard University. Law clerk to
Judge Edward Weinfeld, 1965-1966. The author wishes to thank Bruce A. Ackerman,
Duncan M. Kennedy, Albert M. Sacks, Harry H. Wellington and Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., for their comments and criticisms.
' United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), quoting Fryer v.
United States, 207 F.2d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
2 United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
3 United States ex rel. Caserino v. Denno, 259 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
4 1n re Ullmann, 128 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nor. United States v.
Ullmann, 221 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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cess of alien residents, 5 of government employees 6 and of selective
service registrants. 7 Weinfeld decisions have also protected dissi-
dent political groups from unauthorized congressional investiga-
tions8 and from infiltration by undercover police agents seeking
to entrap them into criminal activities.9 At least at the prelimi-
nary stages of litigation, he has ruled in favor of racial and ethnic
minorities seeking equal protection in housing 10 and in em-
ployment. 1 In these opinions, which reflect his commitment to the
ideal of justice for all, Judge Weinfeld has assuredly been one of
the more creative members of the federal judiciary.
The Judge is not the only innovative member of this group,
however, and his judicial creativity is not the sole basis of his repu-
tation. That reputation also rests upon the distinctive quality of the
more-than-1500 of his opinions that have been published in the
reports-opinions that uniformly bespeak the Judge's thorough re-
search, scholarship and craftsmanship. But his opinions contain
more: they are characterized by a consistency of style that reveals
him as a judge who believes in the existence of unchanging legal
rules and principles that he must find and follow, and as one who,
in fact, pronounces judgments that are products of reason rather
than acts of will. 12
5 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). In a number of cases involving deportation proceedings in which resident
aliens or naturalized citizens have advanced due process claims, Judge Weinfeld has
decided the cases in their favor on statutory grounds, rendering it unnecessary to
reach the broader constitutional issues. See United States ex rel. Kusman v. District
Director, 117 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); In re Oddo, 117 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), rev'd sub nom. Application of Barnes, 219 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956); United States ex rel. Daniman v.
Esperdy, 113 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States ex rel. Chew v. Shaugh-
nessy, 113 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also In re Chew, 278 F. Supp. 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6 See, e.g., Snead v. Department of Social Servs., 355 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (three-judge court), vacated, 416 U.S. 977 (remanded for further consideration
in light of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)), adhered to on remand, 389 F.
Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court) (per curiam); Haine v. Googe, 248 F.
Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (since common law gave public employee right to with-
draw resignation, consideration of due process claim unnecessary).7 See, e.g., United States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Judge
Weinfeld's rationale in Burlich was adopted by the Supreme Court in Mulloy v.
United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1970).
8 See United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff d, 236 F.2d 312
(2d Cir. 1956).
9 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
10 Feliciano v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"I Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.), affrd in
part, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).12 Although Judge Weinfeld appears to fit Karl Llewellyn's description of a judi-
cial formalist in that his opinions are written "in deductive form with an air of
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My objective in the first section of this Article will be to
analyze Judge Weinfeld's style of writing opinions to see how he
avoids infusing his personal policy predilections into his decisions
in an arbitrary fashion. Then, in the second section, I shall seek to
explain how it is possible for a judge in the second half of the 20th
century to avoid arbitrariness in his judgments yet at the same
time maintain a concern for social justice and a position as one of
the more innovative members of the federal bench.
I
Edward Weinfeld calls himself a "fact judge." To the casual
reader, any single Weinfeld opinion often seems merely to decide
disputed issues of fact and to apply the law as discovered by follow-
ing professionally established standards of research and analysis.
The reader of his opinions will almost never find the Judge en-
gaged in the self-conscious making of new law. The opinions seem
to reveal instead a strong faith that existing law will suffice to de-
cide every case coming before him-a belief that, if he uses his
energy and intelligence, he will be able to find the law, and that
failure to find it would reflect on his capacity as a judge, not on the
majesty of the law.
Although Judge Weinfeld has never written or spoken publicly
about the nature of the judicial function, he would, I am con-
vinced, emphatically reject the notion that judges should explicitly
consider competing social policies in deciding individual cases and
advance those policies they think most desirable with new rules
that would replace existing law. The Judge, who is not naive,
knows that existing rules of law often reflect past policy judgments
made in legislative or judicial forums, and, as a well-informed
judge, he is aware of the policies underlying the rules by which he
decides cases. Nevertheless, he considers it no part of the judicial
function, at least at the trial court level, to decide whether social
policies adopted as law in the past should give way to newer com-
single-line inevitability," K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMoN LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 38 (1960), I have purposely declined to label him as such. Duncan Ken-
nedy persuasively suggests that formalism involves more than mere removal of arbi-
trariness from the judicial reasoning process: he thinks formalists also seek to
minimize discretion in factfinding by providing detailed rules for individual fact
situations. To eliminate arbitrariness in rule identification, he theorizes, a formalist
deduces rules from fundamental principles of the common law and liberal political
theory. See Kennedy, Legal Formalism, 2 J. LErAL STUD. 351, 355, 358-59, 363-65
(1973). While Judge Weinfeld is anxious to exclude arbitrariness from the judicial
process, he has never expressly addressed himself to the relationship between rules
and principles, nor does he believe that he should always turn to detailed rules
rather than basic principles as a source of decisional law.
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peting ones. For Weinfeld, the duty of a judge is to apply the
law as it exists, without passing judgment on the policies it may
promote.
Much of my sense of Judge Weinfeld's faith in the existence of
law and his commitment to its application is based upon my year's
experience as his law clerk during 1965-66. That faith and com-
mitment were important operational principles in chambers. The
Judge was always willing to discuss in depth and detail the cases
before him, and he never dismissed any argument I made which
was directed to the law. Largely through his personal example, he
communicated his assumption that we were both professionals en-
gaged in a search, conducted according to professional standards,
for the single correct answer to every legal problem raised by a
case. Since he believed that there could be only one correct ans-
wer for any given problem-an answer whose truth anyone who
understood the profession's standards would be persuaded of once
he was shown it-the Judge never came to a final decision in a case
until he had succeeded in persuading me that his understanding of
the lav was the correct one. If he could not persuade me, he en-
couraged me to do more research and then attempt to convince
him that some other answer was correct. In short, during my clerk-
ship, Judge Weinfeld never conceived of his judicial duty as involv-
ing the exercise of will; never did he rely on the fact that he was
the judge, while I was merely his law clerk, in order to expedite
his work on a case. Rather, the essence of judicial duty as the
Judge saw it was the pursuit of right and justice as they had been
incorporated into law.
The best evidence of the Weinfeld approach, however, is
found in his opinions. The essence of his opinion-writing style is to
avoid deciding unresolved questions of law. When parties to a case
pose such a question, he either attempts to resolve the case on its
facts or probes the law more deeply, searching for a bedrock legal
principle that will make decision of the more specific, unresolved
issue superfluous. Suppose, for example, that in a diversity case
involving an automobile collision tried to the court without a jury,
the parties requested the Judge to decide whether driving in ex-
cess of the new federally mandated 55-mile-per-hour speed limit
--which was designed to conserve gasoline--constituted negli-
gence as a matter of law. Instead of turning immediately to that
unresolved question, 13 Judge Weinfeld would focus on the basic
13 In Cooper v. Hoeglund, 221 Minn. 446, 22 N.W.2d 450 (1946), the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that speeding in violation of a wartime regulation designed to
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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definition of negligence, the absence of that ordinary care which a
prudent person would exercise in a given set of circumstances. He
would then closely analyze the facts in order to decide whether the
driver had used ordinary care. If he found that the driver had not,
no decision about the significance of the gasoline-conservation
speed limit in terms of negligence would be necessary. If the
driver had used due care, the Judge might turn to another issue of
fact, such as the other party's negligence, to see if decision of the
novel legal issue was truly essential to dispose of the case. Only as
a last resort would he decide the new question.
A detailed discussion of some of Judge Weinfeld's opinions will
demonstrate this method. Although I have chosen to consider only
four, they fairly represent the variety of the many published Wein-
feld opinions, since the four cases range widely both in time and
in subject matter. United States ex rel. BeIfrage v. Shaughnessy,14
an immigration case, came before the Judge in his third year on
the bench. Five years later, he decided United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp.,15 an antitrust case that brought him national attention.
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan,16 now a leading case in
criminal procedure, was decided by the Judge in 1966. Vulcan So-
ciety v. Civil Service Commission,17 an equal opportunity employ-
ment case, was written less than three years ago.
United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy was a habeas
corpus action brought by a resident alien after he had been ar-
rested and detained at Ellis Island. The Department of Justice was
holding him without bail, pending the hearing and resolution of
proceedings for his deportation on charges of his alleged affiliation
with the Communist Party. 18 The Government bad previously in-
vestigated Belfrage on similar charges, but bad failed to uncover
evidence sufficient to justify proceedings against him.' 9 Then, early
in 1953, Belfrage was called to testify before the House Un-
conserve gasoline did not constitute negligence, since the object of the regulation
was not protection of the class of which the plaintiff was a member. No New York
case has resolved this precise issue; indeed, New York law is unclear whether viola-
tions of traffic regulations, including speed limits, constitute negligence as a matter
of law or are merely evidence of negligence which a jury can properly consider.
Compare Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 168, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920), with Leotta
v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 460, 171 N.E.2d 454, 459, 209 N.Y.S.2d 304, 311 (1960),
and Lee v. City Brewing Corp., 279 N.Y. 380, 388-89, 18 N.E.2d 628, 632 (1939).
14 113 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1954).
15 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
16 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
17 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).
18 113 F. Supp. at 57.
1 Id. at 59.
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American Activities Committee and Senator Joseph McCarthy's In-
vestigations Subcommittee. Before both committees he refused to
answer questions on fifth amendment grounds.2 0 The Government
arrested him and began deportation proceedings the day after his
appearance before the McCarthy panel, 21 claiming in essence that
an alien's refusal to answer questions about alleged Communist af-
filiations was a sufficient ground for deportation. 22
It must have been tempting for the Judge, who was a strong
opponent of McCarthyism, 23 to have held as a matter of law that an
alien's taking the fifth amendment before a congressional commit-
tee was not a sufficient ground for deportation. In fact, the Second
Circuit so held when it affirmed the decision to release Belfrage
from custody. 24 Judge Weinfeld, however, took a different ap-
proach. Refusing to decide the legal issue posed by the parties,25
he found an answer by referring to the controlling standard set by
the then-recent Supreme Court decision in Carlson v. Landon.26
In Carlson the Court had held that a resident alien charged
with Communist activities could be held without bail pending de-
portation only if the facts showed that the alien, if at large, would
"'so conduct himself. as to aid in carrying out the objectives of
the world communist movement, "27 or if the Government could
prove membership by the alien in the Communist Party, together
with present or recent "personal activity in supporting and extend-
ing the Party's philosophy concerning violence." 28 Examining the
evidence in Belfrage to see if the Government had made out its
case on either of those grounds, Judge Weinfeld found that the
Government had advanced general allegations that Belfrage was an
active member of the Communist Party and the world Communist
movement, that he had associated with principal party, leaders and
that he had traveled to the Soviet Union and engaged in espionage
20 1d. at 58.
21 Id. at 57-58.
22 See Government's Return to Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8-9.
2 This conclusion, based largely upon my own personal sense of Judge Wein-
feld, is buttressed by his close association with Herbert Lehman, one of McCarthy's
earliest opponents in the Senate, see text accompanying notes 103-12 infra, and by
the Judge's pro-civil-liberties decisions during the McCarthy era. See cases cited in
notes 4-5, 8 supra.
24United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128. 130 (2d Cir.
1954).
2 The relator had explicitly posed this issue. See Relators Amended Traverse to
Return at 7.
26 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
27 Id. at 544, quoted in 113 F. Supp. at 60.
2 Id. at 541, quoted in 113 F. Supp. at 60.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 19755
HeinOnline  -- 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 985 1975
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
activities, but it had never availed itself of an opportunity to sup-
plement its allegations with evidentiary facts. 29 Judge Weinfeld also
noted that Belfrage had previously been questioned by the FBI
and by a grand jury about his alleged Communist affiliations and
that, under oath, he had denied all suggestion of Communist
activity. 30 For more than seven years after these investigations,
wrote the Judge, Belfrage "was permitted to remain at large and to
continue his activities, whatever they were." 31 No new facts had
been presented to the court which might justify detention without
bail. Analyzing these factual issues, Judge Weinfeld concluded:
If for the long period of seven years following the FBI and
Grand Jury inquiries, immigration and other governmental officials
did not consider Belfrage's presence and activities inimical to the
nation's welfare and a threat to its security, it is difficult to under-
stand how, overnight, because of his assertion of a constitutional
privilege, he has become such a menace to the nation's safety that it
is now necessary to jail him without bail pending the determination
of the charges, as to which the government has the burden of
proof.32
Judge Weinfeld treated Belfrage's refusal to answer before the con-
gressional committees as just another factual circumstance to be
considered along with every other fact in measuring Belfrage's be-
havior against the Carlson standard. Stating that "the assertion by
Belfrage of his constitutional privilege . . . does not supply the
proof that is lacking," 33 he held that since the Government had not
met the Carlson test, it could not prevent Belfrage's release on
bond.
Five years after Belfrage, Judge Weinfeld decided United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.34 The Government had brought
suit under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 35 to enjoin the merger of
Bethlehem Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company,
which were the nation's second and sixth largest steel companies,
respectively. 36 The defendant companies argued that they should
be permitted to merge in order to enhance their ability to compete
29 113 F. Supp. at 58-59.
30 Id. at 59.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 60.
33 Id. at 61.
34 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
35 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
3r 168 F. Supp. at 585.
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effectively with United States Steel, the largest company and ac-
knowledged trend-setter in industry pricing policies. 37 Moreover,
Bethlehem and Youngstown maintained that a merger would per-
mit them to increase their production capacity in the general vicin-
ity of Chicago in response to a long-felt shortage of certain steel
products in that area-an expansion neither company desired to
undertake individually.38
Judge Weinfeld did not immediately turn to the resolution of
the important and, at that time, unresolved legal issue of whether
necessity to compete could justify an otherwise impermissible
merger.3 9 Instead, he began with an explanation of the central goal
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act as it had been amended in
19504 0---the prevention of any significant reduction of competition
in any market in which two merging companies were competing.41
He then resolved two factual issues. The first was whether any
markets existed in which the merging companies were com-
peting;42 the second, whether a merger would substantially lessen
competition in any of those markets. 43
Resolution of these highly complex issues raised subsidiary is-
sues which could have been treated as questions of law, but which
were not so treated by Judge Weinfeld. For example, the Govern-
ment contended that each of the defendants' product lines that had
peculiar physical characteristics and uses constituted a separate
market,44 while the defendants claimed that markets had to be de-
termined with reference to the ability of steel producers to shift
from product to product.4 5 The Judge did not consider the defen-
dants' claim, because it had no factual basis. He pointed out that
the evidence had established that "the defendants' production flex-
ibility or mill product line theory is indeed pure theory. In prac-
37 Id. at 587; see Brief for Defendants at 3-5, 9-30; Defendants' Reply Brief at
15-19.
8 168 F. Supp. at 616.
39 This issue was later settled in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963) (asserted need to compete with the largest bank in its city and with
New York banks would not justify the merger of Philadelphia's second and third
largest banks). See also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) (absent horizontal or vertical effects,
merger acquisition which will stimulate competition in an oligopolistic industry
does not violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act).
40 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970),formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
41 168 F. Supp. at 581-83.
4 2 Id. at 587-603.
43 Id. at 603-15.
44 Id. at 589; see Government's Brief After Trial at 2-8.
45 168 F. Supp. at 589; see Defendants' Brief After Trial at 59-63; Defendants'
Reply Brief at 8-10.
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tice, steel producers have not been quick to shift from product to
product in response to demand." 46 He also remarked that "continu-
ing relationships between buyers and sellers in the steel industry
make such shifts unlikely."47 Noting in addition the inconsistency
with which the defendants advocated their position, he adopted the
Government's approach toward delineation of product markets. 48
Of course, in favoring the Government's market theory, judge
Weinfeld implicitly accepted its legal sufficiency, but he never ac-
tually ruled that the defendants' position was legally insufficient.
By finding a lack of factual support for the argument rather than
ruling that the theory was bad law, the Judge completely undercut
the defendants' argument and precluded them from advancing it on
appeal.
Another issue which Judge Weinfeld resolved on factual rather
than legal grounds was whether the defendants' or the Gov-
ernment's theory of the relevant markets should govern. The Gov-
ernment contended that the nation as a whole or, alternatively,
certain sections of the country into which both Bethlehem and
Youngstown shipped steel and steel products, should be denomi-
nated the relevant market for the steel industry and for the com-
ponent lines of commerce. 49 Defendants asserted that it would be
more appropriate to view the nation as divided into three sections
or markets-East, West and Mid-Continent. 50 They argued that
Bethlehem was an effective competitor only in the two coastal sec-
tions, while Youngstown was effective only in the Mid-Continent
area. 51 Judge Weinfeld declined to decide whether such a division
of the country was appropriate as a matter of law. He turned in-
stead to a review of industry practice and statistics.
The Judge found that Bethlehem's shipments of over two mil-
lion tons of finished steel products into the Mid-Continent area
represented almost 5% of total shipments in the area and exceeded
the capacity of several major local producers. 52 The volume of
Bethlehem's sales indicated that it was without question nearly as
effective in the Mid-Continent area as Youngstown, which ac-
counted for 7% of that area's total shipments. 53 Naturally, the fac-
46 168 F. Supp. at 592.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 596.
50 Id.
5' See Defendants' Reply Brief After Trial at 33-45; Defendants' Reply Brief at
27-28.
52 168 F. Supp. at 597.
wId.
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tual determination that Bethlehem was a competitor to reckon with
in the Mid-Continent region also involved a legal assumption that a
supplier of nearly 5% of the total goods in any given market was a
substantial competitor-but few would disagree wvith such an as-
sumption. 54 Nevertheless, Judge Weinfeld was not content to rest
his decision solely on his findings about the Mid-Continent region.
His alternative basis for finding that Bethlehem and Youngs-
town competed in the same markets derived from a concession by
the defendants' witnesses that Michigan, the largest steel
consuming state in the nation, was sufficiently important to be con-
sidered a separate market and that Bethlehem, which supplied al-
most 12% of Michigan's total steel needs, was an effective com-
petitor in that state. 55
To summarize Judge Weinfeld's reasoning up to this point:
first, he made findings of fact about the product and geographical
markets in which the parties competed. Then, he reached a legal
conclusion that followed almost inevitably from the facts: because
there was substantial competition between Bethlehem and Youngs-
town, their merger would substantially decrease competition in the
steel industry. Since section 7 specifically prohibits mergers which
would "substantially ...lessen competition," the merger between
the two companies was prohibited by that statute.
Once he had reached these conclusions, the Judge tackled the
defendants' principal claim that the merger should be permitted
because of its likely beneficial effects. He did not initially rule on
that claim as a matter of law; instead, he examined the practical
likelihood that only the merger could achieve the defendants' aims
and that the need for additional capacity in the Chicago area could
not be met without the merger. He found that Bethlehem had suc-
cessfully met past challenges and was well equipped to "keep pace
with the demands of our national economy."' 56 Only after arriving
at that conclusion of fact did he reject the defendants' claim as a
matter of law, holding that "[i]f the merger offends the statute in
any relevant market then good motives and even demonstrable
benefits are irrelevant and afford no defense." 57
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan5 8 may be the Judge's
54 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949). In that case
Justice Frankfurter stated that since Standard Oil requirements contracts affected
6.7% of an area's business, there was support for an inference that competition had
been or would be substantially lessened in that particular area.
55 168 F. Supp. at 602; see Defendant's Brief After Trial at 42-45, 73.
Sr 168 F. Supp. at 616.
5 Id. at 617.
5 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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most masterful opinion. Almars Elksnis, a Latvian immigrant, had
been convicted on his own guilty plea in state court of killing his
common law wife. Ten years later he brought a habeas corpus ac-
tion in federal court on the ground that his plea before the state
court judge had been taken in violation of the Constitution and was
therefore void. Judge Weinfeld released Elksnis from prison, up-
holding his claim on three alternative grounds. One ground was
that any plea offered in return for a promise by the judge as to the
maximum penalty he would impose was not a voluntary plea and
hence was unconstitutional. Essentially this holding was one of law,
yet it was closely intertwined with the facts. Judge Weinfeld ob-
served that before petitioner Elksnis met with the judge to discuss
his sentence, he had resolutely refused to plead guilty and thereby
waive trial. 59 From this fact Judge Weinfeld inferred that thejudge's statement must have had compelling force, 60 explaining
that, even aside from the petitioner's obvious determination to
plead not guilty, there was every reason to believe that the inter-
view with the judge did in fact unduly influence his plea:
When a judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining he brings to
bear the full force and majesty of his office. His awesome power to
impose a substantially longer or even maximum sentence in excess of
that proposed is present whether referred to or not. A defendant
needs no reminder that if he rejects the proposal, stands upon his
right to trial and is convicted, he faces a significantly longer sentence.
One facing a prison term, whether of longer or shorter duration, is
easily influenced to accept what appears the more preferable choice.
Intentionally or otherwise, and no matter how well motivated thejudge may be, the accused is subjected to a subtle but powerful in-
fluence. A guilty plea predicated upon a judge's promise of a definite
sentence by its very nature does not qualify as a free and voluntary
act. The plea is so interlaced with the promise that the one cannot be
separated from the other; remove the promise and the basis for the
plea falls. 61
Strong as this argument may have been, Judge Weinfeld was not
content to base his decision upon it alone, especially in view of the
apparent novelty of the holding 62 and its seeming inconsistency
59 Id. at 253.
60 Id. at 254.61 Id.
62 Judge Weinfeld cited several cases as support for the proposition that "the
imposition by the judge of a sentence contrary to his express promise is wholly ir-
reconcilable with constitutional safeguards and due process of law." 256 F. Supp. at
249 n.12. None of these cases, however, directly states that a guilty plea accom-
panied by a judicial promise is per se involuntary.
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with a contemporary decision of the Court of Appeals for tie Sec-
ond Circuit.63 Consequently, he put forward two other grounds for
invalidating the plea.
The first of these was the fact that the state trial judge had
failed to abide by his promise when he imposed a longer maximum
sentence than the one he had agreed would be imposed.6 The
state agreed that under normal circumstances a sentence inconsis-
tent with a promise upon which a plea had been based would be
void. 6 It argued, however, that in this case the judge was released
from this promise since it had been based upon a misunderstanding
about Elksnis's prior record that had been induced by his attorney
and since Elksnis had acquiesced in its withdrawal. 66
Judge Weinfeld answered the state's initial argument by show-
ing that it was factually incorrect. A careful and thorough review of
the record-in particular, of the testimony of the state trial judge
who had made the promise-established that the state judge must
have known of Elksnis's prior record at the time the guilty, plea was
entered. 67 Concerning the claim of acquiescence, Judge Weinfeld
observed that acquiescence meant a waiver of a constitutional right
and thus had to be measured against the controlling standard of
"intentional relinquishment. '" 6 A review of the circumstances sur-
rounding the plea showed that Elksnis never had explicitly ac-
quiesced in the sentence that had been imposed, nor had he relin-
quished his right to reinstate a plea of not guilty. Indeed, at the
first opportunity he had attacked his sentence on the ground that
the judge had broken his promise. 69 Thus, both because Elksnis
had never actually waived his right to reinstate his plea of not
guilty and because the guilty plea bad been induced by the judge's
63 In United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308, 313-14 (2d Cir.
1963), the court of appeals had expressly stated that judicial participation in plea
bargaining did not necessarily invalidate a guilty plea. See text following note 74
infra. On a second McGrath appeal, 348 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1965), Judge Kaufman
reaffirmed his holding that a judge's advising a defendant on his decision to plead
guilty was not improper. He also remarked, without reaching the merits, that he
doubted that the judge's decision to sentence more harshly than he had intimated he
would when the defendant agreed to the plea constituted a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 378. Nevertheless, he distinguished this case
from two cases cited by the defendant for the proposition that imposition of a sen-
tence differing in length from the one promised rendered a guilty plea involuntary.
Id. at 378 n.3. The key factor was that in McGrath the judge had "made no specific
promises about the sentence he would impose." Id.
6256 F. Supp. at 249.65 See id. at 249-50.
66 Id.; see Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Opposition at 14-16.
67 256 F. Supp. at 250-51.68 Id. at 251.
69 id. at 252.
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promise, Judge Weinfeld found that Elksnis's plea could not be
viewed as voluntary. Since the accepted constitutional standard un-
ambiguously required that a guilty plea be voluntary, 70 Elksnis's
plea had to be set aside.
Judge Weinfeld's final alternative ground for finding that the
plea was not voluntary was that it was not knowledgeable. The rec-
ord showed that when asked by the state judge about the crime
with which he had been charged-the fatal stabbing of his wife
-Elksnis had claimed that he had acted in self-defense or in a
temporary fit of insanity. 71 Since Elksnis had never deliberately
chosen to abandon these defenses, the Judge fouid that the guilty
plea was "not understandingly and knowingly made." 72 On this
ground, too, unambiguous constitutional law required that the
guilty plea be set aside. 73
To appreciate fully the craftsmanship of Elksnis and the law
that it made, one must be familiar with the state of the law at the
time the opinion was announced. Only three years earlier, in
United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee,74 the Second Circuit
had held that a plea was not invalid simply because it was induced
by a judicial suggestion of leniency. Elksnis appeared to take issue
with that holding. 75 Although the Judge could have readily distin-
guished Elksnis from McGrath-in the former case the promise of
a 10-year maximum sentence was explicit, whereas in the latter the
judge had merely advised that a more lenient sentence might fol-
low from a guilty plea to a lesser offense-he did not take that ap-
proach. Instead, he left language in the Elksnis opinion that sug-
gests that any judicial discussion of sentencing, whether or not it
results in an explicit promise by the judge, invalidates a guilty plea
that is a product of the discussion. 76
Despite this broad language, it should be noted that after the
state attorney general's office had studied Judge Weinfeld's Elksnis
70 See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
439 (1963); Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496, 505-10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
931 (1964).
71 256 F. Supp. at 256-57.
7 2 Id. at 257.
73 1d.
74 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963). See also note 63 supra.
75 Judge Weinfeld's only overt expression of lack of sympathy with McGrath was
his citation from the dissent in that case to support his point that there is a signifl-
cant difference between a defendant's bargaining with a prosecutor and a
defendant's bargaining with a judge, "'who [is] ultimately to determine the length of
the sentence to be imposed.'' 256 F. Supp. at 255, quoting 319 F.2d at 319 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
76 See id. at 254.
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opinion, the opinion was found to be so persuasive that the office
withdrew its notice of appeal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. 77 The chief difficulty the opinion must have presented for
the state was that the only actual point of law Judge Weinfeld re-
lied upon was the proposition that a guilty plea must be voluntarily
and knowingly made in order to be constitutionally valid. That
legal conclusion had been affirmed many times by the Supreme
Court. 78 Every subsidiary issue that the Judge decided resulted
from the measurement of the facts against this controlling standard.
It would have been impossible, for example, for the court of ap-
peals to have reversed the alternative legal holding that a plea
made with a reservation of defenses is constitutionally invalid,
without at the same time reversing Judge Weinfeld's finding of fact
that at the time Elksnis reserved his defenses he did not under-
stand what he was doing. Since that finding had unquestioned sup-
port in the record, the Second Circuit would have had no power to
reverse it. Thus United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan is a typi-
cal Weinfeld opinion in that, rather than making new law, it seems
merely to resolve questions of fact that guide decision of the ulti-
mate legal issues, as to which the recognized controlling standard is
not in doubt.
A recent opinion in the same mold is Vulcan Society v. Civil
Service Commission.79 Vulcan was a class action brought by black
and Hispanic individuals to challenge the constitutionality of the
examination administered to applicants for the position of New
York City fireman. The Judge found that the plaintiffs had made
out a prima facie statistical showing that the test discriminated
against blacks and Hispanics. 80 The principal remaining issue was
whether the test was sufficiently job-related-whether the skills it
examined were needed to perform the job of fireman. Judge Wein-
feld noted that there were three professionally accepted techniques
for establishing the job-relatedness and thus the validity of ex-
aminations-predictive validation, concurrent validation and con-
tent validation."' The defendant conceded that it had used neither
of the first two methods, but had relied solely upon content valida-
tion, which consists of nothing more than a check whether "the
content of the examination matches the content of the job."8 2 The
7 7 See Stipulation Withdrawing Appeal, July 28, 1966.7 8 E.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
79 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
8o See id. at 1268-72.
811 Id. at 1273-74.
8 Id. at 1274.
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major legal issue in the case was whether content validation alone
was a sufficient indicator of job-relatedness: in its leading case on
the subject, the Second Circuit had left that issue open; 3 other
circuits were divided. 84 The Judge found it unnecessary to resolve
this knotty question of law. Instead, after a careful examination of
the facts, he concluded that the content validation in which defen-
dant had engaged was inadequate. 8 5
Of course, Judge Weinfeld's opinions are not always written in
the style of the four we have considered above. At times, he ex-
plicitly decides unresolved issues of law,86 especially in cases in-
volving the construction of unclear legislation. 87 Nonetheless, a
study of the mass of Judge Weinfeld's opinions reveals a distinctive
style in his approach to a case. First, nearly every Weinfeld opinion
contains a thorough and sensitive factual analysis, including a pre-
cise resolution of disputed factual issues. This analysis is strikingly
evident in the four opinions chosen for discussion. Second, the
law upon which the Judge rests his decisions is, for the most part,
unambiguous and unchallenged. When he does forge a new legal
doctrine-as with his holding in Elksnis that a guilty plea induced
11 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1177 n.16 (2d Cir. 1972).
84 Compare Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-91 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd in relevant part by an equally divided court, 473 F.2d 1029, 1030 (3d Cir.
1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (city must attempt to devise a test predictive of on-the-
job performance), with Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 729 & n.3. 737-38 (1st Cir.
1972), aff'g in relevant part 334 F. Supp. 930, 942, 945 (D. Mass. 1971) (city must
create test valid under either content or "empirical" validation criteria), and Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 320, 326 (8th Cir. 1971), adopted in relevant part, 452
F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (specific adher-
ence prescribed to guidelines of 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975)). The EEOC guidelines for
valid testing procedures set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975), urged by plaintiffs
upon all three courts in the above-cited cases as the appropriate standard, strongly
favor "criterion-related" (predictive or concurrent) validation, allowing content rela-
tion "where criterion-related validity is not feasible."
85 360 F. Supp. at 1275.
86 See United States ex rel. D'Antonio v. Follette, No. 66 Civ. 51 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 1966), rev'd, 394 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1969); Terry v. Denno, 254 F. Supp. 909
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 110-17 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1952).
87 See, e.g., In re Ullmann, 128 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub norn. United
States v. Ullmann, 221 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (extending
scope of witness-immunity statute in subversion and treason cases to state as well as
federal courts); In re Oddo, 117 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd sub norn. Appli-
cation of Barnes, 219 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd sub non. United States v.
Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956) (limiting the power of the INS to summarily subpoena
naturalized citizens for the purpose of revocation of citizenship); De La Rama S.S.
Co. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), rev'd, 198 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.
1952), rev'd, 344 U.S. 386 (1953) (finding district court jurisdiction under a wartime
ship-insurance statute repealed during the pendency of the action, even though the
repealer contained no savings clause).
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by a judicial promise of leniency is unconstitutional, or his holding
in Bethlehem that a merger that violates section 7 of the Clayton Act
is not cured because it may have beneficial side effects-he rarely
permits the actual outcome of the case to turn solely on the new
point of law. The Judge prefers to introduce a legal innovation
either as dictum or as an alternative holding, often leaing the
reader of his opinion somewhat uncertain what role a newly stated
rule plays.
Normally, as in Belfrage, Bethlehem and Vulcan, the source
of the unambiguous law on which a decision is based will be the
latest authoritative statute or judicial holding on the matter at issue.
In the unusual case such as Elksnis, where an authoritative prece-
dent seems to impede a right result, Judge Weinfeld will base his
opinion squarely on generally recognized principles in order to by-
pass rather than dispute the apparently contrary holding. Although
the Judge-chiefly to economize time and resources-will normally
extract controlling law from relatively few statutes or cases, he fre-
quently seems to be testing narrow rules against a broad back-
ground of legal principle when either his own or counsel's research
leads him to question the validity of a specific rule. The key point is
that the Judge always searches for controlling law of unambiguous
content which cannot be challenged by comparison with a more
general source.
Vulcan is a clear example of this technique. Judge Weinfeld
could have ruled in favor of the plaintiffs either by holding as a
matter of law that content validation is an inappropriate means of
insuring the relevance of an examination or by ruling as a matter of
fact that the defendants' actual performance could not be properly
denominated as content validation. The Judge chose the latter
course, preferring to find facts rather than to make law. In a sense,
he did make law by adding new factual meaning to the legal con-
cept of content validation, but the outcome of the case did not rest
upon this new law per se, i.e., abstracted from its factual back-
ground. Any new lav made in Vulcan remains grounded in the
Judge's findings of fact in that case; it will not be extracted from
them until a substantially similar case arising in the future creates a
need to analyze Vulcan as a precedent.
II
As the preceding discussion suggests, many of Judge Wein-
feld's opinions have innovatively furthered the ends of social justice
through application of what the Judge sees as a fixed body of exist-
ing legal principles. One important question that I now wish to
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explore is how the Judge has been able to ignore considerations of
social policy and apply his unchanging legal principles in a way that
nonetheless promotes essential legal and social change. But first I
must turn at least briefly to several of the many other questions
about the judicial reasoning process that analysis of Judge Wein-
feld's opinions raises.
A preliminary question is whether it is ever possible for a
judge to decide any issue of law without favoring some social
policies or interests over others-an inquiry which arises out of the
Realist critique of early 20th-century American formalism.88 Assum-
ing, as the Realists did, that all legal rules promote particular
policies and interests, 89 it is obvious that a judge cannot avoid
favoring some interests over others. But while he will promote a
policy or favor an interest through every official act, the judge need
not be conscious of doing so, nor need he promote the policies and
interests that he personally prefers. On the contrary, an insensitive
judge can mechanically apply rules of law without ever considering
policy. If, however, a sensitive judge like Weinfeld believes that it
is impossible to decide purely through the use of reason whether to
prefer particular policies and interests, he can almost always turn
away from policy in order to keep his judgments from reflecting his
own preferences and thereby becoming arbitrary acts of will. A
number of techniques have been suggested in recent decades. For
example, a judge can rely on institutional values or on economic
analysis as the basis for his decisions. 90 Or, as Judge Weinfeld
does, he can turn to already existing legal rules and principles. 91
88 See generally W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
(1973); Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind, 103 DAEDALUS 119 (Winter 1974);
White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).89 See Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 CoLUI. L. REV.
431, 461 (1930).
90 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
91 But see J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). Frank maintained that
judges cannot turn to a preexisiting body of law to avoid making policy decisions
since "'Ithere never was and there never will be a body of fixed and predetermined
rules alike for all.... It is impossible to ... eliminate 'the influence of illegitimate
considerations applicable to the particular instance.' " Id. at 120, quoting Salmond,
Introduction, in THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD lxxxiii (1921). Frank's claim
raises important epistemological issues about the nature of human categorization that
cannot be considered within the scope of the present Article. Nevertheless, in re-
sponse to his statement one might point to the actual behavior of many turn-of-the-
century judges who sincerely believed that they could fit the facts of the cases be-
fore them into preexistent categories, that their process of judicial reasoning seemed
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By using legal precedent as the main underpinning for his deci-
sions, a judge will of course promote the policies favored by exist-
ing law. Nevertheless, the use of precedent will foster particular
policies only indirectly, without any need for an explicit judicial
consideration of the relative merits of competing policies.
The question still arises whether a judge should refuse to
choose among policies merely to avoid being arbitrary. The main
point of the Realist critique-that policy choices which inevitably
must be made should be made deliberately and openly and should
not be hidden in institutional considerations or formalistic legal
rules9 2L-has considerable merit. The response that throughout our
history the imposition of limits on judicial arbitrariness has been
viewed as a constituent element of political liberty does not resolve
the question decisively. 93 Nonetheless, the link between tyranny
and judicial arbitrariness ought properly to make us wary of judges
who openly inject policy considerations into their decisions and to
lead us to respect judges like Weinfeld who enlist the artificial
reason of the law or some other impersonal source as the basis for
their judgments.
Another argument that has been advanced against judges' ig-
noring policy considerations and arriving at judgments on the basis
of existing rules and principles is that such a methodology pre-
serves the status quo.9 4 Those who find the maintenance of the
status quo an unappealing social program might point out that ex-
isting principles and rules of law, as they have been manipulated
by conservative jurists of the last half-century, often seem to im-
pede the development of a just and progressive society. Most of
the leading judges of this century, among them Cardozo, Frankfur-
ter and Douglas, have struggled with this conflict between
craftsmanlike adherence to existing law, on the one hand, and
progress and justice, on the other, although each judge resolved
to work for all or nearly all the cases that came before them, and that important
jurisprudential ends were served through grounding of new decisions upon firm ju-
dicial precedent. See Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles
of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Centurj America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 547-66
(1974).
9See FRANK, supra note 91, at 120-21; Llewellyn, supra note 89, at 441-54.
9 See, e.g., THE FEDERAI.ST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH
STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITuTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL
THOUGHT 358-60 (1971); J. STORY, A Discourse Pronounced at the Inauguration
of the Author as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University, August 25, 1829.
in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 511-12 (1852); Nelson,
supra note 91, at 547-66; Ackerman, supra note 88, at 120-21. 123-24.
9 See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66-67, 150-52
(1921) [hereinafter CAPDozo, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS].
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the conflict in a different way. 95 Judge Weinfeld is one of the few
judges of our time who has scarcely felt it: he has been able to
abide by existing rules and principles and at the same time to re-
main committed to the attainment of social justice. The means by
which he has been able to do so is the central question to which I
now wish to turn.
A combination of factors enables the Judge to apply fixed prin-
ciples and at the same time preserve flexibility in the law. Perhaps
the most important is his conception of his judicial role. judge
Weinfeld does not see himself as a social engineer whose task is to
resolve conflicts among competing social classes or interest groups;
instead, he views his responsibility as the resolution of disputes
between litigants in particular cases. Generally, he avoids thinking
about the impact his decision will have on groups or individuals
other than the immediate litigants. As a result, he writes his opin-
ions for the purpose of justifying his decisions to the litigants be-
fore him in terms of existing law, not in order to maximize the
social impact of his views or consciously foster social change.
Of course, Judge Weinfeld's practice of handling cases as dis-
putes between particular litigants rather than as clashes of interest
between large social groups is facilitated by his sitting as a trial
rather than as an appellate judge. In fact, much of the litigation in
the district court does consist of matters having little immediate
significance to anyone other than the parties. The craft of a trial
judge is so different from that required for an appellate court that if
Weinfeld had been an appellate judge the judicial style which I
have described might not, perhaps, have served him adequately.
For example, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court
must find it difficult to view the cases before them solely as dis-
putes between the particular litigants, since the Court, by virtue of
its certiorari procedure, seeks to hear only those cases having
95 Justice Cardozo discussed and analyzed the conflict, maintaining that judges
must give due weight to both precedent and progress, among other factors. E.g., B.
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 42-80 (1924); CARDOZO, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS, supra note 94, at 24-25. Justice Frankfurter also spoke of the need to bal-
ance claims for stability and change, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
266-67 (1957) (concurring opinion), although in the bulk of his judicial work he
seemed primarily concerned with adherence to craftsmanship. Justice Douglas, on
the other hand, stated that judges should not give excessive weight to precedent, see
W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 428-32 (1956), and, particularly in his later years on
the bench, showed substantially more interest in attaining social justice than in writ-
ing opinions that are faithful to the lawyer's craft. See, e.g., Wolfman, Silver & Silver,
The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 255,
272-76, 285-86, 326-30 (1973); Rogat, Book Review, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1964,
at 5 (reviewing Justice Douglas's The Anatomy of Liberty and Freedom of the
Mind).
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broad social or political significance.96 Nevertheless, some cases
have come before Judge Weinfeld in which his role has not been
radically different from that of an appellate judge, at least in that
he could not avoid recognizing that important social issues must
implicitly be resolved as part of the resolution of the parties' con-
troversy. It is in these cases that Judge Weinfeld should feel most
strongly the tension between his perception of his duty to apply
the law as it exists and any felt need to change that law in order to
promote social justice. Two devices, however, enable him to over-
come whatever tensions he might feel.
The first is his intuitive caution. The Judge has never deliber-
ately cultivated his cautious attitude and is apparently not even
consciously aware of it; nonetheless, he often worries that as a
single federal district judge he lacks the breadth of information and
experience and the moral authority to change social and political
practices and policies instituted by elected public officials. For ex-
ample, during his consideration of Elksnis, which he decided when
I was his lav clerk, the Judge often told me that he felt he ought
not invalidate the rather common New York practice of judicial
participation in plea bargaining simply because his view of its pro-
priety differed from the views of many of his counterparts on the
state bench. He finally declared judicial participation unconstitu-
tional only because he became convinced that the law required him
to do so. Even then his caution was reflected in the fact that the
decision on unconstitutionality was put forward as dictum or an
alternative holding, with its exact precedential weight left to future
determination. As a result, Elksnis did not by fiat require New
York State to immediately abandon its practice of permitting judges
to join in plea-bargaining sessions, but merely suggested-by the
persuasiveness of its reasoning-the direction in which federal con-
stitutional law was moving and in which New York judges ought to
move.9 7 As an analysis of other Weinfeld opinions shows, the
96 See Sup. CT. R. 19.
97 The Elksnis limitation on judicial persuasion has often been cited as an im-
portant statement of federal plea-bargaining standards. See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton,
435 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion); Scott v. United States, 419
F.2d 264, 273-74 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d
721, 725 (2d Cir. 1968); Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1967); United
States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
Similarly, the American Bar Association has concluded that "[t]he trial judge
should not participate in plea discussions." ABA STANDARDS RELTIC TO PLE.S
OF GuILTY § 3.3(a) (1968). The commentary to § 3.3(a) recognizes that judges often
participate in plea bargaining sessions. Id. at 72-74. Nevertheless, the ABA decided
that the practice should not be condoned, agreeing with Judge Weinfeld and citing
his statement in Elksnis about the disparity in bargaining power between the judge
and the accused. Id. at 73.
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limited but concrete advance effected by Elksnis is typical of the
Judge's judicial craftsmanship: because Judge Weinfeld ties his
holdings closely to the facts of the cases and often puts them for-
ward only tentatively and ambiguously, his opinions rarely require
anyone other than the immediate litigants to alter their conduct to
conform at once to his restatement of the law.
The second reason why Judge Weinfeld can overcome the ten-
sion between basing his decisions on existing law and simultane-
ously modifying that law is his attitude, shared by few judges of
our time, toward the extension of old law to new subjects. This
attitude is not unusual if one looks back in time: it goes back in
American legal history to the great judges of the early 19th cen-
tury-John Bannister Gibson, James Kent, Lemuel Shaw and
Joseph Story. Using existing law as the starting point of their
reasoning, each brought about substantial change in the law by
flexibly applying old rules and principles. Like Judge Weinfeld,
they were mediators between stability and change.
Let us look more closely at Joseph Story. Both in his opinions
and in his scholarly writings, Justice Story was perhaps the leading
advocate in his time of careful legal analysis and strict adherence to
the rules of law.98 Yet many of his opinions changed the law,9" and
Courts, however, have drawn a distinction between a judge's actually joining in
plea bargaining negotiations and a judge's later discussion of the plea with a defen-
dant, a discussion which Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure man-
dates in federal cases in order to determine the voluntariness of and factual basis for
a guilty plea. United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974); Scott v. United States, supra at 274-75 (Bazelon, C.J.);
United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, supra at 724-25. In Rosa, Chief Judge Kauf-
man stated:
[Wie would be hesitant to hold that the mere participation of the trial judge in
any aspect of plea negotiation-no matter how tangential and unlikely to be
coercive-necessarily renders a plea of guilty involuntary.... The issue ulti-
mately to be resolved is not so much who participated in the plea discussions
but whether the defendant's decision to plead guilty was coerced or otherwise
invalid. . . While we certainly adhere to the proposition that a trial judge
must always act with full awareness of the awesome power of his office. ...
the participation of the trial judge in plea discussions does not in itself render
the plea involuntary....
Id. at 725 (emphasis in original).
Moverover, a condemnation of all judicial involvement in any aspect of plea
bargaining would ignore the practical consideration that the prosecutor's promise to
the defendant is only as good as the judge's affirmation of that promise. " 'The actual
value of any commitments made to [the defendant] by the court' can only contem-
plate plea bargaining in which the judge has participated." Brown v. Peyton, supra
at 1355, quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (standards for
measuring voluntariness of guilty pleas).
9 8 See G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 310-15, 318, 323 (1970).
99 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor,
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he opposed codification for fear that it would render the law
inflexible. 100 How could Story, along with many of his contem-
poraries, have so readily resolved the apparent conflict between
law and progress which we find utterly incapable of resolution? In
part, the answer may lie in the fact that few, if any, Americans in
the first half of the 19th century thought deeply about many of
the central questions of jurisprudence: men like Story, while pos-
sessed of great minds, were too busy in the day-to-day administra-
tion of justice and the building of a new nation to have time to
think deeply about such abstractions. But there was also, I think, a
special historical reason that enabled Story and his contemporaries
to avoid confrontation with our seemingly insoluble conflict be-
tween adherence to existing lav and the need for legal change.
Justice Story's conception of the nature of the legal system which
he and his contemporaries had inherited was very different from
our conception of the system which we have inherited. Although re-
cent historical research suggests that they were probably wrong, 101
Story and many other lawyers of his generation believed that colo-
nial America had not been governed by law and that the mission of
their age was to make law dominant. They did not see themselves
as conservatives seeking to preserve a legal tradition received from
the past, but as progressives who were seeking to replace the crude,
untechnical and essentially lawless system of administration which
they had inherited with a professionally administered body of law. 102
Given their understanding of history, legal change and adherence
to law were therefore synonymous.
It is only our understanding of our own history that creates a
conflict. As we look back at the struggle over federal economic pol-
icy that began during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt and
continued through the New Deal, it seems plain that legal reform
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830); Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829); Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet) 1 (1829); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas.
418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
10o See DUNNE, supra note 98, at 315-18. For Justice Story's exposition of his
views on codification, see Story, Unsigned Article, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMEUCANA
576-92 (F. Lieber ed. 1831), in MCCLELLAN, supra note 93, at 357-72.
101 For my analysis of the technical nature of much pre-Revolutionary property
and contract law, see W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE CoMMoN LAw: THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 48-63
(1975). See also 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 162-279 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel
eds. 1965) (illustrating the often highly technical nature of a successful mid-18th-
century legal practice).
102 See J. STORY, An Address Delivered Before the Menbers of the Suffolk Bar,
at their Anniversary, September 4, 1821, at Boston, in THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 228-32 (1852).
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designed to bring about a more just and equitable distribution of
wealth was continually blocked by existing rules of law that were
heavily oriented toward the protection of private property and
hence the economic status quo. Indeed, even today no radical
change in the economic structure of American society seems likely
as long as existing precedents dominate judicial interpretations of
the Constitution and judicial application of the common law. If one
were to accept the position of the many New Deal ideologues who
favored substantial economic change, then existing law would in-
deed stand in the path of change, and it would be appropriate to
question its value.
But Americans can have an alternative perspective on their
recent history-a perspective in which social progress and legal
change, on the one hand, and existing law, on the other, are not
irreconcilably in conflict. The career of Edward Weinfeld illustrates
this perspective well. In part, this is because Judge Weinfeld, like
Justice Story, is not a speculative thinker, but a man of affairs con-
cerned with the day-to-day administration of justice and the smooth
functioning of the legal system. He has not been influenced by the
quasi-Marxist view held by many intellectuals that all political is-
sues are ultimately reducible to economic terms. His perspective
on history springs from a different source-his early life in New
York City and his experiences in state politics in association with
men such as Governor Herbert Lehman and Senator Robert F.
Wagner.
The first and only time that Weinfeld held elective office was
as a delegate to the New York Constitutional Convention of 1938,
when he was 37 years of age. One of the proposals he introduced
at that convention was aimed at excluding any fruits of an unlawful
search from reception into evidence in criminal trials. 103 The de-
bate on his proposal was quite illuminating. Those who opposed it
feared that it would enable guilty criminals to escape punishment
because of misjudgments by the police in the collection of evi-
dence,' 04 while those who favored it warned generally that if
civil liberties were not protected, the United States, like Germany,
could slide in the direction of fascism. 10 5 Some supporters of the
proposal were quite specific. Chauncey M. Hooper, a black dele-
gate from Harlem, explained that the real beneficiaries of an ex-
1 0 3 See 1 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF TIIE
STATE OF NEW YORK, 1938, at 51 (1938).
104 See id. at 414-17, 424-32, 449-55, 466-69, 478-83, 497-503, 507-08, 522-29,
533-44, 554-58, 562-68.
10 5 See id. at 336-40, 412-14, 417-24, 455-66, 469-78, 503-07, 508-22, 529-33,
546-54, 559-62.
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clusionary rule would not be criminals, but "'a class and a group
that by virtue of an accident of birth" were frequently "victims" of
unlawful "searches" and "assaults."' 06 Later in the debate, Robert
F. Wagner, who was also a delegate, noted that members of labor
unions had also been "subjected to official tyranny, " 10 7 and for that
reason he favored inclusion of the exclusionary rule in the constitu-
tion. Weinfeld himself brought to the convention's attention an
instance in which a Roman Catholic priest who had never been
known to be involved in crime had been a victim of an unlawful
police 'wiretap.1 0 8 Illustrated by the debate on the exclusionary
rule, Weinfeld's commitment to the protection of the human rights
of ethnic, political and religious minorities both in New York and
throughout the world was further demonstrated when, shortly after
the convention, he accepted Governor Lehman's appointment as
state Housing Commissioner. Weinfeld thus began a close associa-
tion with a man who was one of the first statesmen to warn Ameri-
cans of the threat that Nazism posed for the world and of the dan-
gers that similar philosophies of intolerance might pose for
America, and who was later to become the earliest foe of McCar-
thyism in the Senate.' 0 9
In short, Weinfeld and those with whom he associated in his
formative political years recognized that America contained two
societies. One, composed chiefly of white, Protestant, middle-class
native Americans, was ruled by law. Citizens of that society re-
ceived protection from the government both for their property and
for their personal rights. Their relations with each other were regu-
lated according to law. The other society, composed chiefly of
blacks, immigrants and their children, and left-wing political dissi-
dents, often lived amidst violence. Government offered this society
little protection;"i0 in fact, its members were harassed by the au-
thorities, notably the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
local police units."' Life within its own communities was ordered
1o Id. at 444.
107 Id. at 561.
108 See id. at 422-23.
109 See A. NEVINS, HERBERT H. LEIMAN AND His ERA 198-201, 332-51 (1963);
E. Weinfeld, Dedication of the Herbert H. Lehman College of the City University of
New York 5-8 (1969).
10 See THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN A.MERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPAR-
ATIVE PERSPECTIVES 396-98 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969) [hereinafter His-
TORY OF VIOLENCE]; Levy, A 150-Year Study of Political Violence iu the United
States, in HISTORY OF VIOLENCE, supra at 84-100; Meier & Rudwick, Black
Violence in the 20th Century: A Study in Rhetoric and Retaliation, in HISTORY
OF VIOLENCE, supra at 399-404.
M 1See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EN-
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through extra-legal norms, often religious ones.112 Although wealth
was much more common in the first society and poverty in the
second, the key distinction between the two was not economic:
there were poor people in the first and wealthy ones in the second.
In the minds of men like Lehman and Weinfeld, the principal dif-
ference was that members of the second society did not receive the
same protection from the law as did members of the first.
The judicial career of Edward Weinfeld can, I believe, best be
understood as a continuing effort on his part to extend the equal
protection of the laws to individuals and groups which in his youth
did not enjoy it. Three of the four opinions analyzed above are
readily understandable in such terms. In Belfrage, Judge Weinfeld
extended to an immigrant and political outcast the same right to
bail which others-often charged with more serious offenses upon
more substantial evidence-enjoyed. In Elksnis, he granted an il-
literate immigrant the same right to enter a knowing and voluntary
guilty plea which a well-educated citizen represented by able coun-
sel would possess. Finally, in Vulcan he extended to blacks and
Hispanics the same right of access to government jobs that most
inhabitants of New York already possessed.
Thus, for the Judge, as for Justice Story, there is no conflict
or inconsistency between flexibility in the law and adherence to the
law. For Judge Weinfeld, the formulation of new law in Belfrage,
Elksnis and Vulcan represents not the abandonment of law-as it
would have for a Van Devanter or a Roosevelt-but rather the ex-
tension of law to a new area. Even in the Bethlehem case, Judge
Weinfeld could view his decision not as making new law, but as
merely applying old law to a new area in accordance with a man-
date of Congress.
The Judge's position is a historically tenable one. America in
the 1930's came perilously close to being divided into two societies.
While it is possible to view that division essentially as one between
those who had wealth and those who did not, it is at least equally
possible to view it as one between those who enjoyed and those
who lacked the protection of the law. Throughout the 1930's, for
FORCEMENT (WICKERSHAM COMMISSION), REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW EN-
FORCEMENT 13-261 (1931); Black & Reiss, Patterns of Behavior in Police & Citizen
Transactions, in 2 D. BLACK & A. REISS, STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS pt. 1, at 1 (1967) (a report of a
research study submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice).
1 1 2 See J. KRAMER, THE AMERICAN MINORITY COMMUNITY 58-64 (1970); A. ROSE
& C. ROSE, AMERICA DIVIDED: MINORITY GROUP RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 220-55 (1948).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 50:980
HeinOnline  -- 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1004 1975
THE ADJUDICATORY PROCESS
example, there was a black middle class in the United States, yet
the relatively wealthy members of that class lacked many of the
legal rights which even the poorest white possessed.' 13 Immigrants
in general, and politically dissident immigrants in particular, were
treated as second-class citizens and at times, e.g., during the Red
Raids of 1919, were openly persecuted.'1 4 In addition, there was a
substantial difference in the enfbrcement of the criminal law-in
the treatment accorded to the white Protestant middle class and
the remainder of American society. Middle-class neighborhoods re-
ceived far better police protection than did others,"15 and white
middle-class citizens who ran afoul of the law usually received its
procedural protection, while other citizens did not.11 6
Judge Weinfeld's position is also a legitimate one from a juris-
prudential point of view. It rests upon a central premise in Ameri-
can legal, constitutional and political thought-that all men should
be equal in the eyes of the law. If it is true that in the recent past
America has been divided into two societies-one within the pro-
tection of the lav and the other without-then the premise of
equality authorizes a jurisprudential response of the sort which
Judge Weinfeld has given. That response can be deemed a neutral
one at least in the sense of its being impersonal: it is anchored not
in the Judge's private policy preferences, but in a professionally
sound analysis of the fundamental premises of the legal system and
of the recent evolution of American society. Of course, it is not
neutral in the sense that it promotes no values: it does incorporate
a set of political and social values into the law, but only those val-
ues that have already been woven into the fabric of the legal tradi-
tion.
We might ask whether Judge Weinfeld's jurisprudential style
can serve as a model for other judges. The answer lies in the realm
of politics and judicial psychology. For judges who see the divisions
in American society as fundamentally economic, the Weinfeld view
is simply untenable. If a judge regards the existing distribution of
wealth as unjust, then existing law, since it protects private prop-
erty and hence wealth, must be overturned; in its place there must
be substituted a faith, similar to Justice Douglas's, that law is
113 See G. MYRDAL, AN A.M[EBiCAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 689, 703-05 (1944).114 See NV. PRESTON, ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF
RADICALS 1903-1933, at 208-37 (1963).
115 Cf. Comer, The Dynamics of Black and White Violence, in HISTORY OF
VIOLENCE, supra note 110, at 444-64.116 See id. at 27-51; ROSE & ROSE, supra note 112, at 123-27.
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merely the output of the political process and that judges in de-
ciding cases and making new law are merely participants in that
process who must manipulate it in favor of the poor and the
downtrodden. 1 17 If, on the other hand, a judge views the present
distribution of wealth as fundamentally just on the theory that peo-
ple who are poor are in some sense deficient, then be will resolve
the conflict between stability and flexibility in the law in favor of
the former. Only a judge who, like Judge Weinfeld, believes that
the benefits of law have not been extended in the past to all mem-
bers of American society, and that they ought to be so extended,
can believe that by changing law he is strengthening rather than
impairing it.
There is, however, little reason to expect that the Weinfeld
view of the nation's social problems will become the prevalent one.
If, as seems possible, those problems and the litigation they cause
arise increasingly from economic sources, the Weinfeld technique
-mediating between stability and change by obliterating invidious
class distinctions and applying existing law to classes that formerly
did not enjoy its benefits-will become increasingly irrelevant.
Even if the continued existence of class distinctions remains the
chief source of litigation, it will be beyond the capacity of history
or social theory to determine by empirical research whether those
distinctions are a product of legal or economic forces and whether
those forces have operated benignly or invidiously. In short, I ex-
pect that many Americans will continue to view social distinctions
primarily as a product of economic forces. Some will view those
forces as invidious ones that arbitarily render equally meritorious
individuals either rich or poor, while others will see the same
forces as benign ones that merely differentiate among individuals
on the basis of merit.
As long as Americans hold different views about the essential
structure of their society and the nature of its social divisions,
judges will carry different preconceptions to the bench and will use
different reasoning styles in deciding cases and writing opinions.
Some, like Judge Weinfeld, will attempt to extend old law to re-
solve new problems. Others, like Justice Douglas, will seek radical
alternatives to old law and its replacement with something entirely
new. Still others will attempt to adhere to old law without extend-
ing it, although it appears that their task will grow increasingly
117 For an example of justice Douglas's insistence that constitutional decisions
should reflect present social reality, see W. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 48
(1954).
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difficult as judges create more and more new law and the identi-
fication of old law becomes increasingly difficult. Thus, while anal-
ysis of the career and the opinions of Edward Weinfeld on the
occasion of his 25th anniversary on the bench yields a coherentjurisprudential style that mediates between stability and flexibility,
it is by no means certain that his synthesis will become any more
prevalent in the last quarter of the 20th century than it has been in
the first three-quarters.
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